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ABSTRACT 
In Turkey, especially since 2010, the ruling Justice and Development Party has gradually 
assumed all power within the state. In parallel, it has introduced a hegemonic project widely 
known as “New Turkey,” redefining state apparatuses through its proprietary web of networks 
of formal and informal relations. Inclusion in, or exclusion from, these networks is at the sole 
discretion of leading political actors, and can be considered as a state apparatus in itself, even 
though it contains elements that are informal or unofficial. All these networks of official and 
unofficial apparatuses are spread around President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Our research focuses 
on the Twitter interactions of 25 key elements of AKP’s web of networks between 2010 and 
2016, using Social Network Analysis. In the Turkish context, the use of Twitter as a means of 
communication is particularly pertinent, as it stands out as a unique channel for democratic 
discourse. The findings of our research confirm that the Twitter interactions of the 25 official 
and unofficial state apparatuses, with very few exceptions, constitute a network well-connected 
to the core, mostly represented by Erdoğan. 
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Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, third world and emerging countries have been ruled by 
authoritarian regimes.1 The decline of democracy and emerging forms of authoritarianism have 
become the focus of many scholars over the last two decades.2 Turkey has not been immune 
from authoritarian trends, and increasingly so under the dominance of the Justice and 
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) in the new millennium. The AKP came 
to power in 2002, following a period of highly unstable coalition governments3 and has held 
power since, winning successive landslide election victories. Apart from its organisational 
structure and political capacity, one of the fundamental reasons behind the AKP’s electoral 
success has been the broad-based social cache and popularity of Turkey’s current president and 
indisputable party leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Even though the AKP initially promised a 
new, more liberal social contract between the state and citizens, proposed to resolve Turkey’s 
chronic Kurdish and Alevi issues, and advanced judicial reform, the party platform has become 
increasingly authoritarian.4  
 
It would be fair to claim that the AKP has moved, especially since 2010, to steadily capture all 
dimensions of the Turkish state. AKP party members and supporters occupy most top-level 
positions in Turkey’s bureaucracy, justice system and other layers of the state. While the 
annexation of the key levers of state power by the party had triggered multidimensional socio-
political polarisations and conflicts, the AKP’s project of consolidating its control continues 
unabated. Most emblematic is President Erdoğan’s increasing power and dominance over the 
AKP itself and over the Turkish state and society more generally. Indeed, since the failed July 
2016 coup attempt, which prompted even further consolidation of Erdoğan’s power, the 
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president now stands more or less unchallenged within the political firmament. In today’s 
Turkey, there is little differentiation between the ruling party, its leader, and the state.5   
 
In his pioneering study, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, Louis Althusser defines 
the state as composed of an infrastructure (which is comprised mostly by its economic base) 
and a superstructure. He argued that even though it is possible to define the state as a repressive 
apparatus in itself, its superstructure comes into existence in the form of variegated state 
apparatuses of both a repressive and an ideological nature.6 The former function primarily 
through repression and violence (or the threat of them) deployed through instruments under 
direct state control, such as the army, the police, the judiciary, and the prison system. They have 
recourse to coercion to regulate and exert control over society.7 By contrast, ideological state 
apparatuses function primarily through ideology and thus serve to shape or transform the 
society according to the main ideas, principles and objectives of the dominant (i.e. hegemonic) 
political elite. Further to these functions, ideological state apparatuses shape and influence 
society indirectly.8 Religious-based institutions, the education system, non-extreme political 
parties, ministries, multilevel state establishments and communication centres are the first 
things that spring to mind in terms of ideological state apparatuses.  
 
While a core characteristic of the AKP regime has been use of both repressive and ideological 
state apparatuses to impose hegemonic rule over Turkish society, one crucial aspect of its power 
relations is often overlooked. AKP rule has consisted of formal and informal social networks 
that feature an estimated ten million members9 and include hundreds of associations and 
foundations, NGOs, and business ventures. Inclusion in, or exclusion from, these networks is 
dependent on either Erdoğan himself, or on trusted high-ranking cadres within the party. This 
model, which depends on mosques and charity organizations at the bottom and the granting of 
state contracts and joint ventures at the top, is the harbinger of a Turkish party-state that bears 
all the hallmarks of crony-capitalism.10 Thus, we consider a network-based approach 
indispensable to analyse the AKP’s path to hegemony.  
 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a mathematics-based method that aims to detect the 
interactions between actors (along with the roles of each actor) in a network. With this method, 
complex algorithms that analyse the volume of interactions between actors allow detection of 
the most influential members of a network as well as inner-clusters constituted by actors. This 
methodology, born in the eighteenth century, had remained the preserve of academic 
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mathematicians until quite recently. However, with the emergence of online social networks 
and Big Data, this method has garnered attention in helping social scientists explain social 
relations. While SNA may of course be used to explain offline social networks in Turkey, online 
social networks such as Twitter provide another opportunity to utilize SNA.11  
 
Twitter stands out as one of the very few channels that enable citizens in Turkey to express their 
views, particularly following the 2010 Constitutional referendum that opened a new era in the 
consolidation of AKP power. On the one hand, Twitter has enabled media coverage of major 
incidents, such as the 2011 Roboski massacre when 37 civilians were killed by Turkish Air 
Force bombs, due to the number of tweets featuring news of it.12 During the 2013 Gezi 
protests,13 Twitter (albeit not single-handedly), helped protesters create an agenda, take it to the 
national level, organize mass street demonstrations, and even escape police brutality by 
facilitating real-time information sharing about risky locations. Because conventional media 
was heavily (self-) censored during these events, Twitter became an important tool to 
disseminate information among citizens and journalists alike. The use of Twitter became so 
crucial that President Erdoğan himself had to respond and vowed to “eradicate Twitter,” which 
he branded “trouble.”14 Following unsuccessful attempts to block Twitter, the AKP was forced 
to recruit so-called “AK trolls” to break the psychological and political domination of dissidents 
on social media and to advance its own agenda on various online platforms. Therefore, we 
assume that Twitter is a pertinent domain of research, as it is a unique democratic channel where 
pro-government and the dissident public have a balanced share of voice. It is also significant 
that the functioning of this microblogging site is based on social networking, which enables 
researchers to apply SNA to detect the segmentation of users per common interests, the users 
connecting different groups (clusters) and influencers. 
 
In this research, we aim to portray the interactions of institutions that qualify as state 
apparatuses on an online social network platform; namely Twitter. By analysing their Twitter 
interactions (which are exclusively online and discursive), we seek to detect the key actors that 
shape these institutions’ communications on this platform. The underlying assumption is that 
interactions represent one important (albeit limited) online reflection of the AKP power 
structure, along with a survey of how certain actors are included (or excluded) from the national 
online debate.  
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A word of caution is in order. The scope of this research is, by definition, limited to the platform 
under examination, therefore we make no claim that our findings explain how AKP rule 
functions in other domains. That said, it is crucial to note that hegemonic rule cannot be 
analysed in the absence of a clear picture of how it functions on the discursive level. Taking 
into account the fact that interactions online occur in a relatively open digital public sphere, we 
believe that interactions between ideological state apparatuses in this domain may will indicate 
how the AKP regime perceives the the distinction between those who are socio-politically 
“included” and those “excluded” in Turkey more generally. Also, detecting key actors in this 
widespread but rather exclusive network serves to shed light on how it functions, whether in a 
horizontal and democratic or in a vertical and autocratic way.  
 
In this study, we present three key hypotheses. Firstly, we assume that a network that involves 
the interactions of state apparatuses online (or in any other way, for that matter) should feature 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as its key member. In our methodology, we deliberately 
excluded Erdoğan’s Twitter account in our data-collection list. Therefore, Erdoğan will be 
present in our network graph (or map) only if the selected state apparatuses interact with him, 
and will appear as a key member only if he is interacted with heavily. Secondly, we assume that 
there is no distinction between official and unofficial networks within the AKP’s “proprietary” 
web of networks. If there is such a distinction, both official and unofficial networks should 
appear in our network graph in completely different clusters with very few connecting users 
(bridges) between them. If they appear to be connected by more than a few bridges with each 
other and bundled together, this would prove our hypothesis. Thirdly, we assume that the AKP 
state apparatus network is an exclusive, closed network that would not interact heavily with 
actors not seen as having an acceptable level of support for, or orientation towards, the regime. 
For example, dissident public figures or institutions not affiliated with the AKP (e.g. opposition 
political parties, associations, critical media) should not figure in the network map. If they do, 
this would disprove our hypothesis.  
 
The following section presents a brief overview of the pertinent existing literature regarding the 
AKP period in Turkey. The second section lays out our theoretical approach, based on 
Althusser’s definition of state apparatuses. The third section presents the main methodology 
with the pre-selected cases. The last section outlines the main findings of our analysis, followed 
by some concluding remarks. 
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Literature review: Turkey during the AKP period 
The AKP’s 2002 election victory and campaign promises to liberalize the country were initially 
welcomed by many scholars.15 On the other hand, the ideological background, radical past 
statements, and potential conflicts of the AKP leading figures with Turkey’s traditional 
Kemalist establishment left other scholars sceptical of the genuineness of the party’s apparent 
moderation.16 However, after AKP’s first term – and particularly since 2011 – initial scepticism 
about the party’s liberal–secular bona fides have given way to an entirely new set of concerns: 
the party’s turn towards  a Putinesque form of ‘electoral authoritarianism’.  Cihan Tuğal defines 
this slide into authoritarianism as a function of the collapse of the Turkish model of ‘Islamic 
liberalism’.17 As Birol Yeşilada summarizes, the positive environment of the early 2000s has 
been replaced by “a grim picture of illiberal political developments that are characterized by 
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s power grab, loss of judicial independence, and electoral 
manipulations to achieve the desired election outcome that favoured Erdogan and the Justice 
and Development Party.”18 For instance, according to Matthew Whiting and Zeynep Kaya, the 
AKP and its charismatic and influential leader’s attempt to transform Turkey into an ambiguous 
presidential system where the president has increasing control over each and every aspect of 
the judiciary and legislature is perceived as perturbing and polarizing.19 Scholars such as Berk 
Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü define the situation, especially after 2013, as ‘competitive 
authoritarianism’, arguing that Turkey no longer satisfies even the minimal requirements of 
democracy.20 Dağhan Irak uses the term “autocratic Islamists” when referring to the ruling party 
and its leader,21 while veteran scholar Ergun Özbudun has adopted the moniker “majoritarian 
drift.”22 Fuat Keyman and Şebnem Gümüşçü also define the party and Erdoğan as a hegemonic 
power, and by doing so argue that AKP has combined a conservative, religious-based political 
discourse with a commitment to economic and political stability, in order to mobilize the 
majority of Turkey’s citizens as permanent supporters.23 
 
With increased authoritarianism, polarisation and the personalisation of Turkish politics, 
several studies have focused on the impact of Erdoğan on the Turkish state structure, in addition 
to aforementioned studies. For instance, Öztürk addresses Turkey’s Presidency of Religious 
Affairs (Diyanet) under the reign of Erdoğan and the AKP, arguing that it has been transformed 
into an expedient state apparatus for the implementation of the political ideology of the ruling 
cadre.24 Furthermore, Kemal İnal and Güliz Akkaymak focus on the neo-liberal transformation 
of the education system in Turkey during the AKP period and try to explain how Erdoğan has 
derived tremendous political benefit from this shift.25 Additionally, Dağhan Irak claims that the 
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AKP has created a dominant-party system with hegemonic tendencies. In so doing it has 
cultivated both a pro-AKP media, and instrumentalized the state- run media – such as Turkish 
Radio and Television (TRT) and Anadolu Agency (AA) – to advance and support the 
government’s agenda.26 In their brilliant study, Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan demonstrate 
that during the AKP period most successful businesses have been drawn into patrimonial 
relations with the government and have adopted its distinctive cultural values and beliefs while 
cultivating the loyalty to the leading cadre of the AKP, who have themselves moved in to 
leverage their political power to maximize their commercial interests.27  
With the exception of few aforementioned studies, the network-based characteristic of AKP 
rule is often neglected in academic work. Moreover, the use of Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
in these works as a principal method is rare. We aim to fill this void by contributing a rarely-
used perspective along with an innovative methodology. This study may also constitute a good 
example of how political science and media studies may collaborate to explain socio-political 
phenomena, borrowing the theoretical approach of one and the methodology of the other. 
Theoretical background on Althusser’s state apparatuses  
Many scholars, such as Hall, sees Althusser as one of the key figures in modern Marxist theory 
and emphasize his clear break with some of the old protocols of that approach to provide a 
persuasive alternative that nevertheless remained broadly within the terms of the Marxist 
problematic.28 It would be fair to say that Althusser built his studies on the work of Jacques 
Lacan to understand the way ideology functions in society, but this claim is not enough to 
apprehend Althusser and in particular his understanding of ideology and the different 
definitions of state apparatuses.29 From this point of view, it could be argued that Althusser 
advanced a materialist understanding of ideology, rather than considering ideology as simply 
contrived ideas about the world or bald propaganda.30 Furthermore, it is well known that 
Althusser drew part of his inspiration from Gramsci, who used the term civil society as opposed 
to political society. Gramsci, who famously assigned importance to the notion of ideology and 
ethics, contended that civil society also provides the terrain on which the progressive struggle 
of the ascendant class is played out, but Althusser turned this understanding and conceptual 
frame of things around by representing the ensemble of institutions as elements of the state 
mechanism thanks to which the bourgeoisie secures its domination.31  
In his seminal work, On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State 
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Apparatuses, Althusser gave Gramsci his due regarding his famous claim: ‘everyone is a 
philosopher’ and he mentioned that Gramsci’s observation on everyday language, the 
expression to take things philosophically, designates an attitude that itself involves a certain 
conception of philosophy, bound up with the idea of rational necessity. Furthermore, Althusser 
seemed to view Gramsci’s definition of ideology to be essential.32 Yet, Althusser presents 
critiques of both Gramsci’s and the classical Marxist definition of ideology and finds them 
deficient. For Althusser, ideology, especially a dominant one, will tend to unproblematically 
reproduce itself and it may also instrumentalise class and status dichotomies that intertwine 
with history. Secondly, Althusser targets one of the fundamental notions of Marxism: false 
consciousness. He argues that there is only one true ascribed ideology for each class and claims 
that social relations and ideology give their unique unambiguous knowledge to perceiving, 
thinking subjects. Thus, true knowledge should be subject to a sort of masking, the source of 
which is very difficult to identify. Finally, he mentions that knowledge and ideology must be 
produced as the consequence of a special practice that cannot be reduced to a simple empiricist 
epistemology.33 From these points of view, it is possible to argue that for Althusser ideology is 
essentially a practical matter. He claims that ideology exists, being produced and reproduced in 
institutions, and the different types of implementations and practices specific to them.34 From 
this point of view, he categorises state apparatuses in two distinct ways: repressive and 
ideological. 
While ideological state apparatuses represent the ‘soft’ version of the dominant ideological 
expression, repressive state apparatuses consist of the army, the police, the judiciary, and the 
prison system. These operate primarily by means of both psychological and physical coercion 
and violence. Althusser sees ideological state apparatuses as functioning by ideology, using 
means of non-coercion and consent.35 Even though, at first glance, repressive state apparatuses 
seem to be enough for the dominant structure to impose its ideology, they mostly fail to maintain 
social and political hegemony.36 Therefore, the dominant power either unconsciously (but 
mostly consciously) employs ideology to manufacture consent amongst the masses. The 
apparatuses that the dominant political structure uses to do this are called ideological state 
apparatuses, which typically function semi-independently and without explicit intent to exert 
control. Although ideological state apparatuses seem to be relatively dependent on the state 
structure, their dependency is mostly based on the power and coverage of the state’s 
dominance.37  
Althusser delineates several different ideological state apparatuses, most prominently religious- 
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and education-based institutions, various and comprehensive foundations, associations, and 
unions that have direct and indirect connections to the dominant political structure. These 
ideological state apparatuses have the capacity not only to inculcate a certain worldview 
conducive to domination, but also enforce these beliefs by means of a series of rituals, habits 
and practices.38 Furthermore, Althusser insists that ideological state apparatuses belong to the 
state even though they operate according to the dominant ruling structures’ main ideas and 
approaches. In contrast to repressive state apparatuses, ideological state apparatuses “function 
massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression.”39 
As a result, citizens acquiesce not on account of violence, but out of a desire to avoid 
marginalisation, scorn or ostracism. 
From this viewpoint, one may argue that the state, as the macro-level repressive apparatus, can 
regulate and direct the activities and functions of other repressive and ideological state 
apparatuses. Furthermore, the state also constitutes and regulates the relations of all different 
state apparatuses among themselves, including their relations with the macro-structure itself. 
On the contrary, it is the dominant political structures’ mentality and ideology that exerts 
control. According to Althusser, an ideological state apparatus is one that manifests the 
functioning of ideology in a concrete manner in daily life, by employing mechanisms that allow 
individuals to act of their own free will and comply at the same time. Employing a mechanism 
that causes individuals to act of their own free will. For Althusser, a person always acts in 
accordance with his world view of beliefs.40 These relations between action and ideology are 
regulated through material practices controlled by the state. This means that if the state were 
controlled by a dominant and hegemonic structure and ideological mentality, ideological and 
repressive state apparatuses would find it almost impossible to act semi-independently. 
Additionally, Althusser points out that in highly-controlled states, the dominant actors have 
informal (and often quasi-concealed) apparatuses to support the more apparent ideological and 
repressive state apparatuses that can strike individuals almost anywhere.41 The result is the 
enlargement of the state according to the dominant actors’ aims.  
Methodology 
For this research, we selected 25 institutions that may be considered state apparatuses. These 
institutions include key ministries that convey the government’s agenda such as the Ministry of 
National Education, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
along with institutions working under the Prime Minister’s Office such as the Disaster and 
Emergency Management Authority, the Diyanet, and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and 
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Related Communities. The corporate accounts of state-run media outlets such as Turkish Radio, 
the Television Corporation, and AA are also included. Along with the Red Crescent Society, 
NGOs with close ties to the Erdoğan family and/or to the AKP, such as the Ensar Foundation, 
the TÜRGEV Foundation, and the Women and Democracy Association were also selected. To 
test the inclusion/exclusion hypothesis, along with the AKP-run Istanbul and Ankara 
municipalities, we also added the Municipality of Izmir, which is run by the opposition 
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP). The full list of selected 
institutions, with their Twitter handles and their dates of joining Twitter are given in Table 1.  
 
 
Institution Twitter Handle Date Joined 
Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Centre for Strategic Research 
@sam_mfa December, 2011 
Anadolu Agency @aa_kurumsal September 2012 
Turkish Radio and Television Corporation @trtkurumsal February 2011 
Foundation for Political, Economic and Social 
Research 
@setavakfi December 2010 
Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Presidency for 
Turks Abroad and Related Communities 
@yurtdisiturkler February 2011 
The Turkish Red Crescent @turkkizilayi January 2010 
The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency @tika_turkey August 2011 
Yunus Emre Foundation @yeeorgtr April 2010 
Turkish Diyanet Foundation @diyanetvakfi July 2012 
Presidency of Religion Affairs @diyanetbasin November 2011 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs @tc_disisleri December 2009 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs /English Account @mfagovtr October 2011 
Statistical, Economic and Social Research and 
Training Centre for Islamic Countries 
@sesric June 2010 
Ministry of Culture and Tourism @kulturturizmbak January 2011 
General Directorate of Youth and Sports of Turkey @GSBsporgm March 2013 
Ministry of Youth and Sports @gencliksporbak September 2011 
Ankara Metropolitan Municipality @ankarabld December 2011 
Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality @istanbulbld January 2011 
Izmir Metropolitan Municipality @izmirbld July 2012 
The Disaster and Emergency Management Authority @afadbaskanlik October 2011 
Ensar Foundation @ensarvakfi March 2013 
TÜRGEV Foundation @turgev July 2011 
Woman and Democracy Association @kademorgtr June 2013 
Ministry of National Education @tcmeb October 2013 
Council of Higher Education @yuksekogretimk January 2010 
Table 1 –Twitter accounts selected for the research 
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By using NodeXL software,42 we collected the 3,200 most recent Twitter interactions (the limit 
permitted by Twitter) of each user, dating back to 2010. We conducted the data treatment using 
open-source Gephi software.43 The collected data was analysed using the Eigenvector centrality 
algorithm that detects the most influential actors (nodes) in a network44 according to which the 
most important actor has a value closest to 1, and the least important actor closest to 0. The data 
visualisation was also formulated by Gephi, applying the Modularity Class filter that divides 
and regroups nodes into clusters. Therefore, a network map comprised of clusters of nodes 
connected with each other based on their interactions could be produced.  
 
Main findings of the research 
Due to the massive amount of Twitter data available in the 2010–2016 period analysed in this 
research, we divided the data into time intervals in order to observe the changes between each 
period. These time periods roughly correspond to key political events in Turkey, allowing for 
more accurate tracking of the networks.  
 
1 January 2010 – 31 May 2013: The first tweet sent by our selection to the Gezi events where 
protesters used Twitter extensively. 
1 June 2013 – 9 August 2014: From the Gezi protests to the presidential election.45 
10 August 2014 – 6 June 2015: From the presidential election to the first general elections in 
2015. 
7 June 2015 – 30 October 2015: From the first general elections to the second general elections 
in 2015.46 
1 November 2015 – 14 July 2016: From the November elections to the 15 July failed coup 
attempt. 
15 July 2016 – 1 December 2016: From the failed coup attempt to the end of data collection. 
 
In the first period, before the Gezi events, we observe that few of the accounts that we included 
in the selection were then created or actively used. Among them, the accounts of Anadolu 
Agency and the Turkish-language version of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stand out. 
Meanwhile, in the interaction network of our selection (Figure 1), other accounts appear to be 
influential. These include the accounts of Ahmet Davutoğlu (@ahmet_davutoglu, the Foreign 
Minister at the time), Memet Şimşek (@memetsimsek, the Minister of Finance at the time) and 
the official account of the Public Diplomacy Office of the Prime Ministry (Başkanlık Kamu 
Diplomasisi Koordinatörlüğü, @basbakanlikkdk). The reason for the influence of these 
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accounts may be the fact that, in the pre-Gezi period Twitter – for which no localized Turkish-
language version was in place until 2011 – was used by a limited number of people in Turkey, 
most of those being foreign language speakers. Ahmet Davutoğlu and Memet Şimşek are both 
fluent English speakers – a rarity among AKP ministers – and were among the first within the 
government to engage in Twitter conversations in both Turkish and English. Among the users 
with the highest total degree value (the number of incoming and outgoing messages), are the 
Council of Higher Education, the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, and the Yunus Emre 
Foundation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The network graph of our selection, 1 January 2010 – 31 May 2013 
 
 
After the Gezi events, the number of active users in official government functions rapidly 
increased. In the 1 June 2013 – 9 August 2014 period (Figure 2), many ministers and high-
ranking AKP officials such as Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, Egemen Bağış, Mehmet Hilmi Güler, Fikri 
Işık, Akif Çağatay Kılıç, Beşir Atalay, Ömer Çelik, Nihat Zeybekçi – along with official 
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institutions such as the Ministry for European Union Affairs, Ministry of Youth and Sports, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Grand National Assembly of Turkey – joined Twitter. 
Among the official institutions, the President’s Office, the Turkish Cooperation and 
Coordination Agency and the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities stand out 
as influential actors. President Abdullah Gül and the Parliamentary Speaker Bülent Arınç also 
appear to be very influential users. In this period, it can been observed that the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (both Turkish and English accounts) interacts with high-ranking foreign 
officials such as Štefan Füle (European Commissioner for Enlargement and European 
Neighbourhood Policy of the period), William Hague (the UK’s First Secretary of State in the 
period), along with Richard Haas (President of the Council on Foreign Relations in the US) and 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Secretary-General of NATO). Also, Foreign Minister Ahmet 
Davutoğlu’s personal impact on the network diminished while the institution’s official accounts 
took over the interactions. Therefore, it may be said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appears 
to be one of the first government institutions to use Twitter as an official way of communication. 
Also, the Yunus Emre Foundation, a public foundation that aims to promote Turkey and the 
Turkish language abroad, used Twitter in that period in connection with the MFA and the EU 
Ministry. One important appearance in the network is Istanbul Şehir University 
(@sehiruniversite) established by the Foundation for Science and Arts, of which Ahmet 
Davutoğlu was one of the founding members. The university appears in the network in 
connection with the MFA and the Yunus Emre Foundation. This is important because Istanbul 
Şehir is a private university, and therefore a non-governmental organization, the first such 
institution to appear within the network of our sample as an influential member. Another 
striking point is Izmir Metropolitan Municipality, run by the opposition CHP, which appears in 
our graph as it is included in our sample for the first time. However, it has no connection with 
the rest of the network, and has its own cluster (sub-network) comprised of pro-opposition 
users. Meanwhile, as seen in Figure 2, all other clusters of the network are connected to each 
other with at least one edge (connection).  
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Figure 2 – The network graph of our selection, 1 June 2013 – 09 August 2014 
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Figure 3 – The network graph of our selection, 10 August 2014 – 6 June 2015 
 
The 10 August 2014 – 6 June 2015 period (Figure 3) is another period where important changes 
are observed within the network. The most important among them is Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
(@rt_erdogan) joining Twitter, a medium that he had previously condemned on several 
occasions, calling it “the biggest menace” and at one point vowing to eradicate it. Indeed, he 
has sought to block it many times. Newly-elected President Erdoğan’s account instantly became 
the most influential member of the network, referred to by several institutions within our 
sample. Another important development of this period was the strong appearance of pro-
government media in the network. Along with TRT and AA, which significantly increased their 
Twitter activity, many pro-AKP and pro-Erdoğan media outlets –such as Yirmidört TV, Diriliş 
Postası, Vahdet, Yeni Şafak, Milat, Star, Sabah and Türkiye –appeared in the network as 
influential actors close to the core of the network, some even belonging to the same cluster as 
Erdoğan. Some pro-Erdoğan journalists, such as Ardan Zentürk, Çetiner Çetin, Yıldıray Oğur, 
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and Nihal Bengisu Karaca, also appeared in the network, along with the mainstream outlets 
Hürriyet, Vatan, and Habertürk.  
 
In this period, some other new actors also emerge. One of them was Numan Kurtulmuş, once 
Erdoğan’s fiercest critic as the leader of the opposition Islamist People’s Voice Party (Halkın 
Sesi Partisi – HAS) but later Deputy Prime Minister under President Erdoğan. SETA 
Foundation, a pro-government think-tank close to Davutoğlu, who became prime minister in 
August 2014, also appeared in the network as an influential member, in proximity to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the increased importance of the refugee crisis, AFAD (the 
Disaster and Emergency Management Authority) also increased its Twitter activity with local 
branches. 
 
The 10 August 2014 – 6 June 2015 period covers Erdoğan’s first months as president and the 
first months of the AKP without Erdoğan at the helm. There were already hints of the “New 
Turkey” project that would later come to dominate the AKP’s political vision. Communications, 
dominated in the previous period by foreign affairs, became increasingly focused instead on 
domestic politics, revolving around President Erdoğan. The pro-Erdoğan media appeared to be 
influential and central in the network, included prominently in the communication corps of the 
regime. Mainstream media, increasingly under government pressure regarding editorial and 
hiring-firing policies, were not excluded. Other media openly critical of Erdoğan, such as 
Cumhuriyet, BirGün and Evrensel do not feature in the network at all. Another interesting point 
is that newly-elected Prime Minister Davutoğlu’s impact on the network decreased visibly (he 
is less influential than pro-government media and farther away from the core), while the SETA 
Foundation close to him appeared as a fringe element. It would be fair to argue that Davutoğlu’s 
new position was not really a promotion but rather simply established him as a placeholder until 
Erdoğan could establish a new constitution concentrating executive power in the presidency. 
Meanwhile non-official institutions close to him could still benefit from Davutoğlu’s higher 
place in the hierarchy and proximity to state institutions, notably the MFA. This is a trend which 
started in the previous period, with the Istanbul Şehir University example. 
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Figure 4 – The network graph of our selection, 8 June 2015–30 October 2015 
 
The 8 June 2015–30 October 2015 period (Figure 4) is a complicated  yet important period in 
the political history of Turkey, since after the June elections the AKP had failed to form a single-
party government, thus leading to the first hung parliament since 1999. In this period, regarding 
the network graph of our selection, we observe that political actors, including President 
Erdoğan, lost their visibility, while media outlets, especially pro-government ones, dominated 
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the interactions. According to the Eigenvector centrality calculations of the tweets in this 
period, AA’s Turkish account (@anadoluajansi) was the only actor with a full 1.0 value, while 
others such as TRT Haber, TRT Türk, Star, Yeni Şafak, and Daily Sabah were all among the 
most influential actors with values of 0.500 or more. The only political actors with considerable 
Eigenvector values were Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (0.498589), interim Deputy Prime Minister 
Numan Kurtulmuş (0.458321), interim Sports Minister Akif Çağatay Kılıç (@ackilic76, 
0.446397), and the Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (0.439294), who was unable to take 
part in the interim government, but resumed his functions after the elections. All other political 
actors had an Eigenvector value of 0.400 or less.  
 
 
Figure 5 – The network graph of our selection, 1 November 2015–14 July 2016 
 
 19 
The 1 November 2015–14 July 2016 period (Figure 5) was dominated by two themes: the World 
Humanitarian Summit hosted by Turkey on May 23–24, 2016, and the ongoing refugee crisis 
in Syria. Accordingly, accounts and institutions related to these two events had a certain impact 
on the network map of that period. For instance, @dizturkiye, the Twitter account of the World 
Humanitarian Summit had an Eigenvector centrality value of 0.936704, ranking second 
regarding influence. The English account of the Office of Public Diplomacy (@trofficepd) was 
also among the top five most influent accounts with an Eigenvector value of 0.689857. 
Meanwhile, the only account with a full Eigenvector value (1.0) was the pro-government 
private TV network A Haber (@tvahaber). The most influent politician was Yalçın Akdoğan 
(0.898075), the deputy prime minister until May 24, 2016. Tayyip Erdoğan (0.714899) ranked 
second among politicians and fourth in total. The other politician in the Top 10 of the period 
was Minister of Family Affairs Sema Ramazanoğlu (@benbirkulum1, 0.67493). 
Ramazanoğlu’s sudden spike in this era is remarkable, since she faced massive public criticism 
due to her defensive stance towards a child rape scandal that had erupted within the pro-
government Ensar Foundation. It is also intriguing that while the minister received considerable 
attention from other actors, the Ensar Foundation account (@ensarvakfi) itself had the 
minimum Eigenvector value of 0.0. Here, the likely interpretation is that actors in the selection 
were reluctant to be associated with the Ensar foundation and the scandal, but were also ready 
to defend Ramazanoğlu herself and her tweets in defence of the foundation, which we found to 
be an integral part of the network through different periods.  
 
 20 
 
Figure 6 – The network graph of our selection, 15 July 2016–1 December 2016 
 
After the failed July 15 coup d’etat, the network graph of our selection underwent dramatic 
changes (Figure 6). While Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remained the central actor of the network, 
two official accounts, the Prime Minister’s Office (@tc_basbakan) and the President’s Office 
(@tcbestepe) had the highest Eigenvector centrality values (1.0 and 0.679619 respectively). 
One very striking development was the inclusion of opposition leaders Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and 
Devlet Bahçeli (both having Eigenvector values of 0.363987) into the core network for the first 
time. This otherwise unexpected development is indeed due to the two leaders’ participation in 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s massive Yenikapı rally in support of the President against the putsch. 
This rather spontaneous coalition, named the “national consensus” or “Yenikapı spirit,” also 
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brought the Izmir Municipality into the network, a rare event. Meanwhile, the pro-government 
media closest to the President – such as 24 TV (@yirmidorttv, 0.454662), TV Net (0.501731), 
and Güneş newspaper (@gunes_gazetesi, 0.432859) – emerged as the most influential media 
actors in the network. In addition, one anonymous account called “Failed Coup Facts” 
(@failedcoupfacts) had an Eigenvector value of 0.411056) and frequently interacted with the 
Turkish Embassy in the Vatican (@VATIKANBE) through retweets and quotes. Another 
significant inclusion to the network in this period was Birol Akgün (@birol_akgun), the 
chairman of the newly-founded Maarif Foundation, an institution established by the Ministry 
of National Education, in order to take over pro-Gülen schools abroad.47 Akgün’s personal 
presence within the network is likely to be replaced by an official Twitter account for the 
foundation, which at the time of writing had yet to be established. 
 
The particularity of the post-putsch era in our Twitter interactions network is the rising 
importance of official institutional accounts, rather than personal accounts as well as the 
inclusion of two opposition parties as embedded members of the network. Meanwhile, the pro-
Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (Halkların Demokrasi Partisi – HDP) was not featured in 
the network, despite its unambiguous anti-coup stance. We should note that the HDP was the 
only party in the parliament that opted out of participation in the Yenikapı rally.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
When all the Twitter interactions of our 25 preselected accounts in 2010–2016 are taken into 
account (Figure 7), the final table of all actors (including others that were not preselected but 
included in the network through interactions) and their Eigenvector centrality values are given 
below (Table 2). These findings suggest that Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the only political actor 
that has a full Eigenvector centrality value of 1.0 among all actors. Anadolu Agency’s Turkish 
news account (@anadoluagency) ranks second, with 0.953466. This is expected as most state 
institutions, along with pro-government private institutions quote AA as their primary news 
source. The presidency’s official Turkish account (@tcbestepe) ranks third with 0.944741. 
Yirmidört (24) TV channel is the only private institution in the Top 5 (fourth, 0.877474), while 
TRT Haber ranks fifth (0.784143). Other actors of the Top 10 are the official Turkish account 
of the Public Diplomacy Office of the Prime Ministry (0.743485), the official Turkish account 
of Prime Minister’s Office (0.741246), Sabah newspaper, Yeni Şafak newspaper and the 
Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency’s Turkish account (@tika_turkey).  
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Figure 7 - The network graph of our selection, 1 January 2010–1 December 2016 
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User 
Eigenvector 
Centrality 
rt_erdogan 1.0 
anadoluajansi 0.9534661699114985 
tcbestepe 0.9447410600224696 
yirmidorttv 0.8774741849508173 
trthaber 0.784142868758094 
basbakanlikkdk 0.7434851427732126 
tc_basbakan 0.7412460145051754 
sabah 0.6856335322169869 
yenisafak 0.6811499132186776 
tika_turkey 0.6794010186726467 
ntv 0.6732818396764239 
yurtdisiturkler 0.6613684980643978 
stargazete 0.6534493570814608 
milliyet 0.6381856378597932 
haberturk 0.6381856378597932 
turkiyegazetesi 0.6381856378597932 
byegm 0.6356261764559795 
gencliksporbak 0.6334183753007457 
tvahaber 0.6245273438819402 
 
Table 2 – Top 20 users by Eigenvector Centrality value, 1 January 2010–1 December 2016 
 
 
These findings suggest that our first hypothesis, which claims that a network that involves the 
interactions of state apparatuses on the online realm, or any realm for that matter, should feature 
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the key member, is fully proven since Erdoğan is the only 
actor with a full Eigenvector centrality value. The official presidential account also ranks in the 
Top 3 which suggests even further influence over all other actors. 
 
Our second hypothesis argued that there was no distinction between official and unofficial 
networks for the AKP’s web of networks. Regarding media, we can comfortably say that this 
hypothesis is valid since private pro-government media, such as 24 TV, A Haber, Sabah and 
Yeni Şafak had equal (if not higher) influence in this network compared to state-run media such 
as TRT and AA, which are also very influential. This is despite the fact that state-run media 
institutions are more numerous within the network. This suggests overall that media is a core 
influencing element of Erdoğan’s regime. Meanwhile, other institutions such as associations 
and foundations like Ensar Foundation, TÜRGEV and KADEM, which have direct links to the 
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AKP and/or the Erdoğan family, are not equally central to the network. While these institutions 
are certainly inseparable parts of the network that have more than one connection to other 
institutions, they are not core elements but rather function as extensions of the regime. As we 
suggested in the beginning, these institutions, albeit not crucial or central, are nonetheless 
intertwined with the rest of the network. Therefore, the second hypothesis is valid to a 
considerable extent.  
 
Our third hypothesis argued that the network of AKP state apparatuses should constitute a close 
network that would not include those not be deemed to indicate an acceptable level of support 
for or orientation towards the regime. While our findings mostly confirmed this hypothesis, we 
should note that there are circumstantial exceptions. The most notable are opposition leaders 
Bahçeli and Kılıçdaroğlu, who emerged as core members in the network after they joined the 
post-putsch Yenikapı rally. It should be underlined that this is quite startling, since the rally was 
intensely pro-Erdoğan, with overt hegemonic tones. The participation of the leading opposition 
leaders, along with the Chief of Staff of the armed forces and the Diyanet chairman as military 
and religious leaders of the nation, respectively, therefore provided an element of institutional 
consent, essential to any given hegemony. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the HDP and 
other elements of Kurdish politics (along with the Kurdish media) have been strictly and 
completely excluded from the network. Even during the Kurdish peace negotiations that lasted 
for over five years, state institutions (along with state apparatuses of an unofficial nature) 
abstained from interacting with Kurdish actors online. This is noteworthy, as the Kurdish 
presence on Twitter has been very strong for many years, evidence by the success in bringing 
the Roboski massacre in 2011 to the national agenda.  
 
One other remarkable finding is the importance of state apparatuses responsible for Turkish 
foreign policy, such as the Office of Public Diplomacy,48 TİKA, and the Presidency for Turks 
Abroad and Related Communities. As we stated before, the foreign policy actors were the first 
to join Twitter and to use this medium effectively among state-run institutions. These actors 
continue to be influential vis-à-vis the AKP’s web of networks. However, their impact on their 
target audiences such the Turkish diaspora or foreign policy actors of other countries should be 
examined in more detail in future research. 
 
The municipalities of three major metropolitan cities proved to be ineffective within our 
network. While even the mostly secluded Izmir Municipality, run by the opposition CHP, was 
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once connected to the core, the Izmir and Ankara Municipalities constituted distant clusters of 
the network, and the Istanbul Municipality did not have great importance either. This was a 
surprising finding, as Ankara mayor Melih Gökçek is an avid Twitter user who spends hours 
responding to pro-government and dissident users. Furthermore, he participates in hashtag 
campaigns, such as that run against BBC reporter Selin Girit whom Gökçek believed to be a 
British spy.49 One explanation might be that his personal account is much more active than the 
official municipality account, thus overshadowing it. Nevertheless, even Gökçek himself is not 
a major figure in this network.  
 
Conclusively, the Twitter interactions of our preselected 25 formal and informal state 
apparatuses, with very few exceptions, constitute a network well-connected to the core, mostly 
represented by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The interactions mostly happen on the institutional 
level, with even Erdoğan himself sharing his impact more and more with the official 
presidential account, while at the same time being himself the key “institution” within the 
network. Other key actors such as former President Abdullah Gül, former Prime Minister 
Ahmet Davutoğlu, current Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım, and former Minister of Interior 
Affairs Efkan Alâ do not have the same long-lasting impact as Erdoğan. Even in their heyday, 
their political impact never compared to that of Erdoğan. The importance of key political actors 
to the network in any given period is limited to their term in office and once leaving their posts, 
their significance drops off noticeably. Even most prominent AKP members’ impact on this 
network is defined by the collective importance given to them and eventually taken from them. 
Erdoğan remains the only person that appears to be exempt from this pattern. 
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